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DLD-116        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 





LYNN Z. SMITH, 




ANDREA DOBIN, Esq.; ELI HALTOVSKY; FIVE STAR  
SERVICES LLC; HONORABLE ANNE E. THOMPSON;  
HONORABLE MICHAEL B. KAPLAN; JOHN DOE 1; JOHN DOE 2;  
JOHN DOE 3; JOHN DOE 4; JOHN DOE 5; JOHN DOE 6;  
JOHN DOE 7; JOHN DOE 8; JOHN DOE 9; JOHN DOE 10 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil No. 1-18-cv-17515) 
District Judge:  Honorable Esther Salas 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Due to a Jurisdictional Defect or  
Possible Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
March 11, 2021 
Before:  JORDAN, KRAUSE, and PHIPPS, Circuit Judges 
 






* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 






 Lynn Z. Smith appeals from the order of the District Court dismissing her 
complaint.  We will affirm. 
I. 
 Smith is the debtor in an ongoing Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding during which 
the Bankruptcy Judge authorized the sale of her house pursuant to a judgment of 
foreclosure.  The sale was consummated on November 1, 2018.  Smith’s unsuccessful 
efforts to avoid the sale—which did not include an available appeal of the Bankruptcy 
Court’s order authorizing it—are described in In re Smith, 757 F. App’x 77 (3d Cir. 
2018) (affirming Bankruptcy Court order converting Smith’s bankruptcy proceeding 
from Chapter 13 to Chapter 7).  Smith also has filed with the District Court at least six 
other bankruptcy appeals and three civil actions implicating her bankruptcies.   
This appeal concerns one of those civil actions.  In this case, which Smith filed 11 
days after our decision in In re Smith, Smith filed a complaint pro se alleging in wholly 
conclusory fashion that the sale of her house resulted from a “fraudulent bid-rigging 
scheme.”  As defendants, Smith named her Chapter 7 Trustee, the Bankruptcy Judge, a 
District Judge who presided over her bankruptcy appeals and one of her related civil 
actions, the individual who purchased her former house at the bankruptcy auction (Eli 
Haltovsky), and a company allegedly hired by Haltovsky to perform “demolition” work 




former house in its original condition as well as millions of dollars in damages.   
The District Court, acting on motions to dismiss filed by three of the four 
categories of defendants, dismissed Smith’s complaint as follows.  First, the District 
Court dismissed Smith’s claims against the Trustee pursuant to the Barton doctrine 
because Smith did not obtain the Bankruptcy Court’s permission before seeking 
resolution of those claims in a different court.  See In re VistaCare Grp., LLC, 678 F.3d 
218, 224-28 (3d Cir. 2012) (discussing Barton v. Barbour, 104 U.S. 126 (1881)).  Second, 
the District Court held that Smith’s claims against Haltovsky are barred by claim 
preclusion because the Bankruptcy Court, in its sale-authorization order, already has 
adjudicated Haltovsky a good-faith purchaser for purposes of 11 U.S.C. § 363(m).  Third, 
the District Court dismissed Smith’s claims against the judicial defendants and Five Star 
without prejudice for inadequate service of process.  The District Court also noted that 
Smith’s complaint suffered from other deficiencies, including its failure to state any 
plausible claim to relief and the fact that her claims against the judicial defendants likely 
are barred by judicial immunity.  Smith appeals.   
II. 
In addition to filing this appeal, Smith also filed a motion for reconsideration with 
the District Court.  The District Court docketed that motion about a month and a half 
after Smith filed this appeal and about three months after its order of dismissal.  As 




App. P. 4(a)(4).  The District Court later denied that motion on October 14, 2020.  Smith 
claims that the District Court committed “fraud” by failing to docket the motion sooner, 
but we lack jurisdiction to review the District Court’s handling of that motion because 
Smith did not file another notice of appeal after the District Court denied the motion and 
her time to do so has expired.1  Thus, the only order before us for review is the District 
Court’s order of dismissal.  We have jurisdiction over that order under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.2 
III. 
  We will affirm.  Smith has filed over 20 documents in support of this appeal, 
including two responses and a letter purporting to supplement the record after we advised 
her that we would consider taking summary action.  Smith, however, has not 
 
1 Smith has raised complaints about the District Court’s handling of her motion for 
reconsideration in documents that she filed with this Court both before and after the 
District Court denied the motion.  The documents that she filed before the District 
Court’s ruling cannot serve as notice of appeal from that ruling.  See Marshall v. Comm’r 
Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 840 F.3d 92, 94-95 (3d Cir. 2016) (per curiam).  In the documents that 
she filed after the District Court’s ruling, Smith does not indicate any intent to appeal 
(which she knows how to do) and instead asserts merely that the District Court’s alleged 
fraud constitutes a ground to add the District Judge as a defendant.  Thus, we decline to 
construe any of these documents as a notice of appeal.  And because Smith could have 
filed a notice of appeal from the denial of reconsideration but did not, we also decline to 
treat any of her filings as a petition for a writ of mandamus.  See Gillette v. Prosper, 858 
F.3d 833, 841 (3d Cir. 2017) (noting that “mandamus must not be used as a mere 
substitute for appeal”) (quotation marks omitted). 
 
2 Although the District Court dismissed certain of Smith’s claims without prejudice for 
insufficient service of process, the District Court did not permit Smith to cure that defect 
and instead twice directed its Clerk to close the case.  Thus, the District Court’s order is 
final for purposes of § 1291 because the District Court dismissed the entire action and the 




meaningfully challenged the District Court’s order of dismissal.  Indeed, Smith has not 
even mentioned the grounds on which the District Court dismissed her complaint, let 
alone raised anything suggesting that those grounds present a substantial question.   
Nevertheless, we will affirm the District Court’s order of dismissal on the 
following grounds.  First, we will affirm the District Court’s ruling that it lacked subject-
matter jurisdiction over Smith’s claims against the Trustee under the Barton doctrine.  
See In re VistaCare Grp., 678 F.3d at 224-28.  We add, as did the District Court, that 
Smith was well aware of the Barton doctrine because the District Court previously 
applied it in dismissing Smith’s claims against the Trustee in one of her other 
bankruptcy-related actions.  (D.N.J. Civ. No. 1-18-cv-11483, ECF No. 15.)  Smith did not 
appeal that ruling. 
 Second, we will affirm the District Court’s ruling that Smith’s claims against 
Haltovsky are barred by claim preclusion, and we conclude that Smith also failed to state 
a claim on which relief can be granted.  Smith unsuccessfully challenged Haltovsky’s 
purchase of her former house in the Bankruptcy Court, which adjudicated Haltovsky a 
good-faith purchaser for purposes of 11 U.S.C. § 363(m).  Smith either litigated or could 
have litigated her allegations of fraud regarding Haltovsky in that proceeding.  See In re 
Pursuit Capital Mgmt., LLC, 874 F.3d 124, 135-36 (3d Cir. 2017) (explaining that “good 
faith” for purposes of § 363(m) requires, inter alia, the absence of fraud or collusion); 
 




CoreStates Bank, N.A. v. Huls Am., Inc., 176 F.3d 187, 194-95 (3d Cir. 1999) 
(describing claim-preclusive effect of Bankruptcy Court orders).3  To be sure, Smith’s 
allegations of fraud against Haltovsky (like those against the other defendants) are wholly 
conclusory.  Thus, to the extent that Smith’s allegations may be too deficient to permit a 
determination whether she litigated or could have litigated them in her bankruptcy, those 
allegations fail to state a plausible claim to relief, see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 
678 (2009), and amendment of her complaint is not warranted.4 
 Third, we will affirm the dismissal of Smith’s claims against the judicial 
defendants on the ground that those claims are barred by judicial immunity.  Smith 
alleges that the judicial defendants, through their rulings, either sanctioned or failed to 
 
3 Among Smith’s few factual allegations (which she asserts in several of her filings but 
not her actual complaint) is the allegation that Haltovsky told her husband in August 
2017 that “I am the only person who can buy your property.”  If that alleged statement 
called into question the validity of the sale to Haltovsky as Smith claims, then she could 
have raised it in the Bankruptcy Court before that court approved the sale almost a year 
later on July 25, 2018. 
  
4 Smith has had adequate notice and opportunity to address this issue.  Haltovsky argued 
in the alternative below, and the District Court suggested, that Smith failed to state a 
plausible claim to relief.  Smith filed at least two responses on that issue in which she 
insisted that Haltovsky already had adequate notice of her claims.  (E.g., ECF No. 19 at 
11-12.).  Smith also has filed numerous documents in support of her claims in both the 
District Court and this Court, all of which we have reviewed, some of which promise to 
provide an amended complaint or evidence that never proves forthcoming, and none of 
which suggests that Smith has any plausible claim against Haltovsky, let alone any claim 
that she could not have raised in the Bankruptcy Court.  Thus, to the extent that Smith 
may have attempted to assert a claim against Haltovsky that would not have been barred 
by claim preclusion, we conclude both that she failed to state a claim and that amendment 




correct the other parties’ alleged fraud.  It is apparent that Smith bases this claim solely 
on the judicial defendants’ judicial rulings, which were not made “in the clear absence of 
all jurisdiction.”  Capogrosso v. N.J. Sup. Ct., 588 F.3d 180, 184 (3d Cir. 2009) (per 
curiam) (quotation marks omitted).  Indeed, Smith alleged in her complaint that the 
judicial defendants’ alleged misconduct “can be proved entirely from the court records.”  
(ECF No. 1 at 7 ⁋ 14.)  Thus, her claims against the judicial defendants fall squarely 
within the bounds of judicial immunity.  See Capogrosso, 588 F.3d at 184. 
 Finally, we will affirm the dismissal of Smith’s claims against Five Star on the 
ground that she failed to state a plausible claim to relief.  Smith’s claims against Five Star 
are derivative of her claims against Haltovsky because she alleges only that Five Star, 
working with Haltovsky, performed work on and removed property from her former 
house, which Haltovsky bought at auction.  Smith has not stated any claim against 
Haltovsky as explained above, so she has not stated and has no basis for a claim against 
Five Star either.    
III. 
For these reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.  Smith’s 
motions are denied. 
 
